IN WHAT IS NOW SUDAN, THERE OCCURRED OVER THE CENTURIES A PROCESS OF TA'RIB, or Arabization, entailing the gradual spread of both Arab identity and the Arabic language. As a long-unfolding cultural process, ta'rib in Sudan has been remarkably successful, particularly in its linguistic guise. In some parts of Sudan even now, Arabic continues to spread at the grassroots as a lingua franca and literary language. By contrast, Arabization as a post-colonial policy of national integration has been a failure. By provoking hostility and resistance, the top-down policy of ta'rib has undermined the very national unity that its proponents sought to achieve in the years that followed decolonization in the 1950s. At the same time, the policy of ta'rib has contributed to Sudan's woeful history of civil strife, in Southern Sudan from the 1950s and more recently, from 2003, in Darfur.
Historically, ta'rib in Sudan began in the early Islamic era with the influx of Arab Muslim nomads. The process accelerated after the fall of Nubia's Christian kingdoms in the early fourteenth century, and, following the sixteenth-century rise of the Funj sultanate of north-central Sudan, reached a state of consolidation along with Islamic culture more broadly. 1 As Islam spread in Sudan, knowledge of Arabic spread, too, both because Muslims sought to study the Arabic Qur'an, and because Arabic offered a welcome 'technology of literacy' 2 for recording land deeds, significant events, mercantile and budgetary transactions, and biographical accounts of remarkable figures.
as families constructed pedigrees through the 'invention of tradition' 4 to assert descent from illustrious male forebears of Arabian origin. 5 Arabization in Sudan occurred in two other notable ways: first, as slaves (drawn from Ethiopia, Southern Sudan, and western regions as far as Lake Chad) and their descendants were slowly incorporated into free Arabic-speaking families and communities; and second, as some members of non-Arab communities, such as Fur and Fulani in Darfur, acquired large herds of cattle and formed alliances with Arab pastoralists like the Baggara, in the long run changing communal affinity through patterns of settlement, intermarriage, and language assimilation. 6 The term ta'rib is capable of covering a spectrum of linguistic and ethnic change, and this is appropriate for the Sudanese case, given that it is so hard to pin down the moments among individuals or groups when linguistic and ethnic change converged.
By the time Sudan gained independence in 1956, Arabic was by far the most widely spoken language in the territory. Yet Arabic was still only one language among scores of others that were found in the young republic. The 1956 census, the last for which ethnic and linguistic data was collected, identified 3,989,533 out of 10,262,536 (some 38.8 percent) Sudanese as 'Arab', but identified 51.4 percent as primary speakers of Arabic (thereby hinting at a probable Arabization-in-progress).
7 Scholars have repeated the numbers from the 1956 census ever since -sometimes conflating the figures for Arabs and Arabic-speakers, rounding the numbers up or down, or attributing them to other researchers, but ultimately depending on them as authoritative in the absence of subsequent data. 8 Nevertheless, Sudan's linguistic composition has clearly changed in the half-century since 1956.
This article analyses the historical development of Arab identity and ideology in Sudan by focusing on the colonial, Anglo-Egyptian ) and post-colonial Sudan republic (1956-present) politics -issues of language and identity politics, civil conflict, Arab ideology, and racism. Next, it considers how conceptions of Sudanese Arab identity changed in the first half of the twentieth century, reflecting indigenous attitudes towards slavery and assumptions about social hierarchies that were associated with the Arabic term sudani ('Sudanese'), which derived from a word for black (aswad, pl. sud). It then traces the career of Arabization as a post-colonial policy, initiated in Khartoum, which aimed to undo divisive British policies by spreading Islam and Arabic while simultaneously enhancing the cultural credentials of weak regimes. The article also considers how Arabization policy affected the course of civil wars fought in Southern Sudan from 1955 to 1972 and later, after 1983, in Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains. Finally, the article assesses Arab identity and ideology in the light of recent events in Darfur, and addresses the claim that an ideology of Arab racial supremacy has gained momentum in Sudan. Ultimately, the strong-arm Arabist ideology of successive post-colonial Khartoum regimes has stimulated the formation of an oppositional, if still inchoate, Africanist ideology stressing connections to a plurality of African cultures and languages rather than to the cultural singularity that Arabism ('uruba) implies.
The political relevance of Arabization
In the last two decades of the twentieth century, linguists and other social analysts suggested that the linguistic map of Sudan was changing in three ways. First, many of Sudan's languages were claiming fewer than 2,000 speakers and were facing potential extinction (such as Bongo, once spoken in the Southern region of Bahr al-Ghazal).
9 Second, English, the mother tongue of the British colonizers, was no longer the chief language of post-primary school education, having been replaced by Arabic through successive government decrees. 10 Third, Arabic was continuing to spread as a spoken language. This was evident in Darfur, in Southern Sudanese towns such as Juba and Wau, and in greater Khartoum among Southern Sudanese refugees. Arabic was also spreading among Hausa-and Fulanispeaking immigrants, most of whom came in the early twentieth century from what is now northern Nigeria. However, even while Arabic was spreading as a lingua franca, the Arabization policy of the post-colonial central government was backfiring by eliciting resistance. Modes of resistance varied by region. After the resumption of civil war in 1983, rebel leaders and intellectuals in Southern Sudan rejected the idea of Arabic as the country's sole official language and called for official Arabic-English bilingualism, or multilingualism, in matters of state and education. 12 At the same time, Southern civilians turned to Christianity in droves, partly as a way of resisting a regime that was trumpeting Islamist credentials. 13 In Sudan's predominantly Muslim eastern and western peripheries, meanwhile, local leaders and intellectuals increasingly resented the central government's monopoly on wealth, power, and resources, as well as the patronizing way that riverine Northern Arabs seemed to treat non-Arabs.
14 This resentment translated into the formation of regional political blocs. A prime example was the Beja Congress, founded in 1957 among Beja-speaking intellectuals of the Red Sea Hills region in north-eastern Sudan, whose leaders called for a federalist (less Khartoum-centric) system of government. 15 All of this meant that, as the twentieth century ended, the spread of Arabic was not ineluctably leading to the spread of Arab identity. 16 In an article entitled 'Racism in Islamic disguise?', Sharif Harir wrote in 1993 that Khartoum's heavy-handed policies were leading, if anything, to a retreat for Arab identity and for national identity in the face of 'upsurging ethnicity'.
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In 1994, B. G. V. Nyombe, a linguist at the University of Nairobi who specialized in Southern Sudanese linguistics, sharply criticized the Arabization policy of successive post-colonial Khartoum governments, but described this policy as an open door. 'According to this policy,' Nyombe wrote, 'if a non-Arab became a Moslem, and acquired a Moslem name and culture, he became an Arab.' 18 Islam, he implied, offered a rapid transit to Arab identity and Arabic culture, though Southerners were not necessarily interested in taking that route. Nyombe expressed the sense that Sudanese social borders might be negotiable and that Arabism was not genealogically exclusive. He recognized, perhaps, a strain of inclusive idealism that was found within some pan-Arab discourses, and especially Egyptian pan-Arab discourses -an idealism that emphasized loyalty to the Arabic language as sufficient for membership in the Arab world community. 19 Nyombe began his article in 1994 with an explanation of Sudan's social landscape.
In the Sudan, issues of language, culture, religion and race are so closely interlinked as to be inseparable. For the Northern Sudan Arab government which constitutes the de facto central government, there has been an obsession since independence with the political need to project the Sudan to the outside world as a homogeneous Arab nation; a nation with one language (Arabic), one religion (Islam), one culture (Arab-Moslem culture), and most importantly, one race (Arab). The reality is of course far different.
Later he used the linguistic assessments of the 1956 census to bolster his claim that 'The Sudan is a nation of two races, African and Arab.'
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In fact, the 1956 census did not distinguish between 'Arabs' and 'Africans' per se, but rather between 'Arabs' and others. The census also assumed a distinction between the Sudanese North and South (as indeed British policy makers had done). Nyombe 24 Prunier agrees that a reactive Africanist ideology has sharpened, but dates its provenance earlier, to decolonization in the mid-twentieth century. 25 In this way the Darfur conflict has increased the tendency of scholars to emphasize an Arab-African binary in Sudan, and to move further away from an interpretation, much-favoured among Sudanese intellectuals in the 1960s and 1970s, which stressed Sudan's unique AfroArab hybridity, cultural tolerance, and capacity for internal coexistence.
These scholars agree that Arabism in Darfur is increasingly racial or racist in the sense that it assumes a certain hierarchy of peoples, which in turn reflects histories of unequal power relations, and that it is 'reinforced by the intricate patterns of public discourse, power and privilege within the economic, social, and political institutions of the state'. 26 Together with historians of the Nile Valley such as Jok Madut Jok and Eve M. Troutt Powell, they agree, too, that in Sudan's case racial assumptions are inextricably connected to internal histories of slavery. 27 On an everyday level, this racism is manifested by Arabs' derogatory use of the term 'abid ('slaves') -and what the Northern Sudanese writer Mansur Khalid called 'a series of [other] unprintable slurs' -to apply to western and southern peoples. 28 This Arabism is ideological, meanwhile, in the dictionary sense that it has inspired and justified a scheme of actions or policies that are implicitly or explicitly adopted and maintained 'regardless of the course of events'. 
The making of the Sudanese Arab
The fact that Sudanization became so closely associated with the country's Arab elite reflects one of history's surprising turns. Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, there was no such thing as a self-identified 'Sudanese Arab' among the riverine region's Muslim elites. At that time, to be Arab was to be Muslim, to be Arab was to be free, and, ideally, it was to claim an Arab pedigree. Arabs, in short, were not slaves and the term 'Arab' ('arabi, pl. 'arab) connoted high status. That is because in the northern regions of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, where both Islam and the Arabic language prevailed, Arabness was associated with Muslims who claimed Arab clan and tribal affiliations (that is, genealogical credentials) and who styled themselves as the local heirs and bearers of Islam. By contrast, a deeply entrenched slave trade had bestowed servile connotations on the adjective Sudanese (sudani in Arabic), which derived from the Arabic term sud, meaning 'black people', and which was related to the term that Arab geographers had used for the region of Africa stretching from what is now Senegal to Ethiopia (Bilad al-Sudan, meaning 'lands of the blacks'). In the view of high-status Muslims who regarded themselves as Arabs, being Sudanese meant being black, as the Arabic root of the term denoted, and being black, in turn, meant having low social status. 31 In other words, Northern Sudanese society was highly stratified and had its own internal peripheries.
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British colonial authorities preserved much of this stratification, for while they abolished the slave trade in 1899 (and slave holding itself, incrementally thereafter), 33 they did not promote egalitarianism. On the contrary, British officials respected local status hierarchies and reinforced them through education policies. They did so by favouring high status 'Arab' males for the academic educations that would lead to administrative jobs, in the process co-opting these men and thwarting their resistance to the regime. 34 Meanwhile, they guided those of slave descent, whom the British in the early years of the twentieth century variously called 'Sudanese' or 'detribalized blacks', into army careers and manual jobs. In fact, these 'Sudanese' soldiers and officers, assigned to Sudan's rural peripheries, also played an important role in propagating Arabic culture. That is, by establishing outposts of spoken In the words of Jay Spaulding, MacMichael's motives were practical rather than academic, for as a racist he believed that to a considerable degree the behavior of the people entrusted to his governance was determined by their ancestry; for example, the political conduct of twentieth-century Northern Sudanese could be inferred from the inherited animosities of their putative pre-Islamic Arabian forbears of a millennium and a half before.
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These policies for education and colonial government employment had long-term political consequences. By favouring self-defined Arabs at the expense of everyone else, including not only Arabic-speaking former slaves or their descendants, but also non-Arab Muslims and non-Muslims (such as the Dinka), the British cultivated a group of men who had the literacy and the political know-how to develop and articulate nationalist ideologies. Not surprisingly, these men defined a nation in their own social image, as an Arab Muslim community.
The only group that eluded British policies of preferential treatment for Arabs were the Nubians, who came from villages located north of Khartoum, up to the border with Egypt. While Nubian males spoke Nubian languages at home, they tended to have a strong command of Arabic since they came from communities in which economically motivated migration to Egypt, and later to Khartoum and other Sudanese towns, was common. Writing in 1979, Sondra Hale called Nubian men a 'stranger elite' in Sudanese towns: so socially and linguistically at ease were they when operating within Arab and Arabic cultural milieus that some of them, in the Anglo-Egyptian and post-colonial eras, were able to slip into the emerging Sudanese urban intelligentsia to a degree that other non-Arabs were not. Hale and others have noted a gender discrepancy that enabled Nubian men to avoid full-scale assimilation and Arabization: namely, they were en-It was really the nationalist movement of the 1930s and 1940s, expressed through new approaches to Arabic literature, that made it possible to speak for the first time of a 'Sudanese Arab'. The meaning of 'Sudanese' had started to change under British rule after 1898 -it had started to become, in certain contexts, a simple adjectival form of the colony's name, and a useful way of distinguishing the residents of the Anglo-Egyptian territory from those of Egypt and neighbouring colonies. Nationalists adopted this usage and expanded it, seeking to ennoble the term 'Sudanese' as a badge of national identity, without necessarily destigmatizing the legacy of slavery to which the term had originally referred.
A major breakthrough for Sudanese nationalism came in 1927 when a poet argued in the pages of a Khartoum journal that Sudan could and should have a distinct Arabic literature -a literature that would be 'Sudanese' through its reference to local settings, customs, and concerns. Strikingly, the poet who made these claims -a man named Hamza al-Malik Tambal -was an ethnic Nubian, whose Arabic compositions, according to a later Egyptian critic, were marred by grammatical flaws. 39 Readers were initially outraged or alarmed by Tambal's essay -for here was the adjective 'Sudanese' being applied, for the first time, to the noble Arabic language. 40 Despite initial reservations, the idea caught on within the small audience of newspaper readers, who as a result of their employment in the colonial administration and their job postings throughout the colonial territory had begun to develop a sense of Sudan as a geographic whole.
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In the 1930s, it became fashionable among these young educated Northerners not only to identify themselves as Sudanese, but to write and speak openly of Sudanese nationalism. Their usage helped to popularize use of the term in the years before decolonization. To make the term more appealing, nationalists coined a new plural form for the Arabic adjective sudani: instead of using the Arabic plural sud (literally meaning 'blacks') to describe themselves, they adopted a new plural form: sudaniyyun, to mean Sudanese nationals. Notwithstanding these efforts to redeem the term for nationalism, associations between Sudanese-ness and slavery were hard to expunge, so that the term did not gain universal acceptance among high-status Arabs of the North. After independence in 1956, a few Arabs initially refused to apply for a passport, because they would have to register themselves as 'Sudanese' to get one. Some older Arabs hated the idea of being called Sudanese so much that they later proposed changing the name of the country to Sennarafter the capital of the Funj Sultanate. 42 Meanwhile, in the 1930s and 1940s, the search for local authenticity forced early Sudanese Arab nationalists to seek out and praise indigenous folk customs. By asserting that the folk customs of Northern Sudan, and particularly those of the Bedouin Arabs, derived from pre-Islamic Arabian customs, they suggested that Sudan preserved cultural legacies that other parts of the Arab world had lost. 43 Thus urban intellectuals relied on Bedouins for Arabist credentials (for example, by romanticizing Sudan's Bedouins in poems and travel accounts), 44 even though Sudan's Arab pastoralists never gained direct power in Khartoum's corridors. The same inclination to prove Arab authenticity prompted some nationalists to declare that the Sudanese dialect of Arabic was among the most pristine. 45 This idea has endured in the post-colonial period as a kind of local wisdom. In a work published in 1979, for example, a literary scholar maintained that the Sudanese dialect, 'though surrounded on all sides by African languages . . . has maintained its linguistic purity intact . . .. By the 1940s, nationalists also began to emphasize the country's cultural distinction by positing a theory of ethnic hybridity for the Sudanese Arab. The timing of this theory was significant: it arose because independence was appearing on the distant horizon, and the educated Northern Sudanese -as 'Arabs', nationalists, and colonial government employees -needed to justify their claims for the future assumption of power. They needed to show, in other words, that they had a vision for the entire colonial territory, as well as a mission for leadership.
In 1941, Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub, a leading nationalist and future Prime Minister, articulated this theory of hybridity by describing Sudan as 'the legacy of successive generations of the inherited and the commingled' resulting from the fusion of indigenous blacks (sud and zunuj) with immigrant Arabs, as well as Turks, 'Asians', Abyssinians, Egyptians, Nubians, and Maghribis. In his view, this mixed population owed its cultural superiority, acquired through reason, intelligence, and courage, to the 'Arabs'. Mahjub declared that, to build upon these merits for the sake of national progress, embracing the Arab Islamic heritage was 'inevitable'. 47 'Abd alRahman 'Ali Taha, the nationalist who became the first Sudanese Minister of Education, declared in 1949 that, 'as the Sudan is one country sharing one set of political institutions it is of great importance that there should be one language which is understood by all its citizens. That language could only be Arabic, and Arabic must therefore be taught in all our schools.' 48 When the British authorities began to withdraw from Sudan in the early 1950s, nationalists like Taha, who had for long been the colonial regime's heir apparents, set out to transform their ideas into policies.
Arabization in practice: post-colonial identity politics
In 1950, as decolonization loomed, Northern Sudanese nationalists formulated plans for introducing Arabic into all Southern Sudanese schools. They were eager to dismantle three British policies that they viewed as having been nationally divisive. The first was the Closed Districts Ordinance of 1922, which had restricted Northern traders and others from entering Southern districts without a permit. The second was the language policy for Southern Sudan that emerged from the Rejaf Language Conference of 1928, which identified six 'vernaculars' (Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Bari, Latuko, and Zande) for development as languages of primary education, along with English for advanced study. The third was the policy of ceding educational development to Christian missionary organizations, each of which, according to a 'sphere system', had enjoyed a virtual monopoly over particular regions to establish schools. These policies had worked to the detriment of Arabic and Islam, and Northern Sudanese nationalists resented them deeply. 49 The Northern Sudanese linguist, Sayed Hamid A. Hurreiz, went so far as to describe these language policies as a 'war on Arabic' that justified the subsequent policy of Arabization. 50 But it proved impossible to introduce Arabic education overnight. In the early 1950s, an Egyptian linguist from Cairo University named Khalil Muhammad Asakir, who was hired to help Arabicize the Southern schools, found that among eight hundred Southern Sudanese school-teachers, 'knowledge of Arabic was nil'. Thus, as Northern Sudanese educators began to teach Southern teachers how to read the Arabic script, Asakir began to devise systems for rendering Southern languages into Arabic script. 51 Northern Sudanese policy setters hoped that use of Southern vernaculars rendered in modified Arabic script would be a first step towards learning literary Arabic, and that 'a unification of the alphabet would tend to reduce linguistic diversity and consequently bring South and North socially close together'. 52 In 1975, in a study of rendering the Shilluk language in Arabic script, the linguist Yves Le Clézio compared Sudanese policy to the Soviet Union's. Le Clézio pointed out that in the USSR, 'the Cyrillic alphabet, a traditional element of the dominant Russian culture, was felt to be a factor of integration for the non-Russian-speaking peoples, and . . . was imposed onto most of their languages'. 53 In retrospect, the comparison does not bode well for Sudanese national unity. Consider that when Moldova secured its independence from the Soviet Union in 1989, one of the first things it did was to drop the Cyrillic alphabet that Stalin had imposed and to restore the use of Latin orthography; other post-Soviet republics, such as Azerbaijan, switched to Latin orthography, too.
Arabization policy gained a sharper edge after 1955 when there occurred in Torit, Southern Sudan, an army mutiny that observers later identified as the start of civil war. Months later, on 1 January 1956, Sudan gained independence, declaring Arabic its sole official language and Islam its religion of state. In 1957, Northern Sudanese politicians announced the nationalization of Christian missionary schools. In 1957, too, a 'Southern Federal Party' issued a manifesto calling for recognition of English along with Arabic as an official language; Christianity along with Islam as a state religion; and 'the transfer of the Sudan from the Arab world to the African'. The central government responded to the manifesto by sentencing its author to seven years in prison for sedition. 54 In 1958, a military coup brought to power General Abboud, who proved to be an even greater hardliner on Arabization and its partner, Islamization. Abboud's government immediately opened six intermediate-level Islamic ma'hads (akin to seminaries) in Southern Sudan. Four years later, in 1962, his regime expelled foreign Christian missionaries, on the grounds that they were standing as a 'bulwark in the path to national integration', in the words of a government report, and that they were guilty of various infractions including sheltering, supplying, or otherwise abetting 'mutineers' and 'outlaws', meaning Southern rebels. 55 The year 1962 also witnessed a strike among Southern Sudanese students, who staged a protest against the government's policies of Arabization and Islamization. Some Southern Sudanese activists later submitted a petition of protest to the United Nations, claiming that authorities had retaliated against the strike's leaders by pulling their teeth out with pliers. The petitioners complained that Muslim Arab teachers from Northern Sudan 'engage too much in politics -unity of the Sudan, Islamic history, Arab League -and such other irrelevant subjects that make the children confused and lose interest in the teaching'. They also complained that Christian students who refused to attend Qur'an studies were expelled from school, and described the government's policy as an attempt 'to create a subservient race dwelling in ignorance but embracing Islam and those who preach it'. a subject in these two years and as a medium of instruction from the third year on).' 57 Language policy became a mode of resistance. Why were the policies of the Islamic and Arabic-medium government schools so distasteful to the Southern Sudanese rebels? The question seems relevant since Christian missionary schools in the Anglo-Egyptian period had engaged in similar policies, such as pressing children to adopt new names and offering educational advancement as an inducement to conversion. 58 The major difference after 1956 was that the national government was no longer officially colonial, and educated Southerners aspired to a share in national power. Moreover, what Northern politicians regarded as policies of national unity, many Southern intellectuals regarded as cultural colonialism, precisely because they had no choice or voice in the matter. There appears to have been a sense among Southerners, too, that Arabized education was cheating them -that standards were low and falling, that teachers were weak, unmotivated, or merely propagandistic, and that Southerners, educated in Arabic, were left unable to compete with educated native Arabic-speakers. 59 In 1972 the civil war ended when President Numayri signed the Addis Ababa Accord. This treaty recognized Southern demands by agreeing to a more equitable distribution of political power and economic resources; it also tacitly accepted English as a language of regional administration in Southern Sudan. The Accord held out the possibility of a new and more inclusive Sudan, but its promises for sharing went unfulfilled. In 1983, after Numayri proclaimed Islamic Shari'a the law of the land, war resumed as John Garang assumed command of the Southern resistance known as the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A). Numayri's regime fell in 1985, but the regimes that succeeded him continued to uphold Shari'a law and to insist on Arabic and Islam as national unifiers. 60 But this time Southern Sudanese were not the only ones poised to resist. In the late 1980s, civil war spread to the Nuba Mountains, where a locally led branch of the SPLA was formed. After 1989, the military-Islamist regime of General Beshir nevertheless held firm, by skilfully manipulating factionalism among its rivals (a technique that analysts have compared to the colonial strategy of divide and rule) and, after 1999, by dipping into new oil export revenues in order to bolster its military arsenals. 61 In 1989, the French linguist, Catherine Miller, issued a bleak verdict on Sudan's post-colonial policies of Arabization and Islamization as they related to war in the South. These policies amounted to a series of 'successive failures', she wrote, and 'testify to the difficulty of applying preconceived ideologies without accounting for facts on the ground'. Ultimately, she wrote, 'abusive centralization and the non-recognition of ethnic minorities have cancelled out the capacity for potential integration that [the government's policies] of Islamization and Arabization may have held'. 62 Reflecting on Arabic culture in Southern Sudan, the Sudanese linguist Ushari Ahmad Mahmud was equally blunt. 'International and indigenous professionals acting as linguistic specialists will get nowhere,' Mahmud wrote, 'as long as they continue to avoid the real issues of political power distribution and social inequalities. . ..' 63 Given the failure of Arabization policy to promote national unity and concord, why, then, did successive post-colonial regimes cling to the policy so fiercely? The answer is that historically Arabic-Islamic culture has enjoyed so much prestige in Northern Sudan that politicians in Khartoum seized upon it to prop up their credentials in moments of weakness. Lip service to promoting Arabic and Arab culture also proved useful as a means of winning political and financial support from countries like Saudi Arabia and Libya. As a policy, ta'rib thereby functioned as both a tool and a cudgelenhancing political legitimacy and power at the centre and drawing support from abroad, while supplanting local languages with Arabic and quashing claims to peripheral autonomy.
Sudan's civil wars: when does ethnic identity turn into racism?
In 2003, as the current round of war was erupting in Darfur, the historian Douglas H. Johnson published a book called The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars. His use of the plural -'wars', not 'war' in his title -was significant. Johnson argued that the civil war that plagued Sudan from 1955 to 1972 (usually called the 'first' civil war); the war that afflicted the country from 1983 until, arguably, the signing of a Sudan Government-SPLM/A treaty in 2005 (usually called the 'second' civil war); and other internal conflicts in modern Sudan, had all been related to each other organically. 64 His framework has made it easier for scholars to situate the current Darfur conflict within the plurality of Sudanese civil conflicts, and to show linkages between Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, and Southern Sudan. Two connections are salient. First, many observers suggest that the political rhetoric of John Garang inspired and emboldened the Darfurian rebels of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), whose attack on government garrisons in El Fashir 2003 are said to have precipitated the current violence. Garang extolled the possibility of a 'New Sudan' -a Sudan that would be ethnically pluralistic and socially inclusive, and inherently 'Africanist' rather than 'Arabist'. 65 Darfurian rebel leaders later envied what Garang and the SPLA secured in the 'Comprehensive Peace Agreement' with the Beshir regime in 2005: promises of a sharing of power and wealth, and of a degree of political decentralization (much as in the accord of 1972), but this time with an escape clause -namely, a planned future referendum on whether Southern Sudan should remain part of the whole or secede. 66 De Waal and Flint have suggested that Garang's death in an apparently accidental helicopter crash in 2005, a mere two weeks after the signing of the treaty, was a blow for Darfur as well; had Garang lived, he might have placed a check on the Khartoum regime's efforts to egg on and abet the Arab militias. 67 The second salient connection is that the conflicts in Southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, and Darfur also occurred within the context of Arab militarization. In the mid-1980s, the Northern Sudanese government decided to arm Arab tribal militias in order to wage proxy wars against Southern Sudanese and Nuba 'rebels' and civilians. These militias were the forerunners of the Janjaweed who now ravage Darfur, even though the exact tribal composition of these armies has differed. Similarly, in the late 1980s and the 1990s in Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, as now in Darfur, militias on the ground were supported by the central government's military intelligence and aerial bombardment campaigns. 68 But Darfur's militarization was aggravated by another, external factor: in the 1980s, the Libyan government began to arm Darfurian Arabs, in this case with the idea of using them to topple the Chadian regime of Hissène Habré. 69 Reflecting the offbeat pan-Arabist ideology of Mu'ammar Qadhafi, who had a vision of creating an Arab Muslim belt in Sahelian Africa, the Libyan government also recruited some Darfurian Arabs into the Tajammu' al-'Arabi, which de Waal described as a crucible for Arab racial supremacist ideology. 70 In 2004, under the leadership of Musa Hilal (whom de Waal and Flint call one of the most powerful leaders of the Janjaweed militias) Tajammu' al-'Arabi issued a directive that called upon its supporters to 'change the demography of Darfur and empty it of its African tribes'. 71 When does Arab ethnic identity become Arab racism? Amir H. Idris has pointed out that racism in the Sudanese context has been rooted in local histories of slavery and in the unequal distribution of wealth and power between regions and social groups. But in the post-colonial period, and now especially in the context of Darfur, Idris has argued that racism has sharpened within the climate of fear surrounding Arab pastoralists -who are buffeted by drought and desertification, awash in guns but not in wellwatered grazing lands, and abetted by a regime that is determined to retain its power by crushing internal rebellions. 72 Racism has been flourishing amidst violence, among disproportionately well-armed Arabs who can kill with impunity. One could perhaps extend the adage that 'a language is a dialect with an army' to say that, with regard to Sudan today, Arab and African 'races' are ethnicities with armies.
However, not every expert on Sudan is ready to accept the argument that Arab racism or racial supremacy is a real factor in the current Darfur conflict, or in Sudanese internal politics more broadly. In 2005, in a review of Gérard Prunier's recent book on Darfur, for example, the development economist Michael Kevane expressed scepticism about Prunier's contention that 'the Arab vs African clash [in Darfur] is not a local and ethnic one' but rather 'a national and racial one'. Prunier 'lays it on thick', he wrote, in claiming that 'the northern elite has been deepening its self-conception as a racial group, characterized by Arabness', Kevane also expressed scepticism about what he called Prunier's pop-psychologizing tendency to ascribe the intensity of the Sudan government's Arabization agendas to a sense of inadequacy within the larger Arab world -that is, to a sense that Sudanese Arabs, because of their dark skins and their experiences of facing discrimination in the Middle East, were somehow not Arab enough. 79 Idris remarked in a similar spirit that successive post-colonial Sudanese regimes have treated non-Arabs and Arabs as though they have different 'entitle-ments'. 'Those who are considered Arabs by the racialized state are treated as citizens,' he wrote, 'and those who are perceived as non-Arabs are treated as subjects.' 80 Still others have rejected Arabism's totalistic claims: some have not wanted a Sudan with cultural unity; some have preferred a Sudan that recognizes and tolerates difference. This rejection of monoculturalism and assimilation is what prompted John Garang, in the end, to call for a New Sudan that would be a 'united, secular, democratic, multi-racial, multi-lingual, and multi-religious Sudan'. 81 Successive Sudanese governments -parliamentary and dictatorial alikehave cherished the ideal of the Sudanese Arab so much that they have insisted on assimilation, rather than pluralistic inclusion and acceptance of difference, as the only approach to national unity. In trying to pursue their agendas in the context of civil wars, they have turned Arabization and Islamization into martial policies. The Beshir regime has been particularly clear on this score: Beshir declared in the 1990s that his regime was 'fighting for [the] Sudan's Arab-Islamic existence', that its policies to impose Islamic law and Arabic were merely a reflection of divine will, and that its war against dissidents was a jihad. 82 But the policies that Beshir ascribed to God's will have bred only ill will, particularly since his regime has supported Arabization in a country that has had a post-colonial political and economic culture of Arabs-take-all. In May 2000, an anonymously authored and distributed 'Black Book' made the rounds in greater Khartoum, eluding government censorship: it purported to show 'what everyone knew but never articulated: that the vast majority of government positions in Khartoum, from cabinet ministers to their drivers and all the bureaucracy in between, were held by members of three [Arab] tribes which represented only 5.4 percent of the population'. 83 Some claim that the book's authors had ties to the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), one of the two rebel groups that took to violence in Darfur in 2003. 84 Such is the depth of ill will that many non-Arab Sudanese today appear to look upon Northern riverine Arab elites as outsiders, enemies, colonizers, and usurpers -certainly not as compatriots. In 2007, the Arabic language continues to spread as a lingua franca, particularly in Darfur (including in displaced people's camps), 85 among Southern Sudanese refugees, and in southern towns, though the appeal of Arab identity and ideology appears more limited than ever. Amidst the rancour of post-colonial conflict, ta'rib is likely to proceed as a linguistic process, but without the attendant adoption of Arab identity. The spread of Arabic, in sum, will offer Sudan no shortcut to national unity and no guarantee for survival within present-day borders. 
